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Abstract—Viral marketing is becoming important due to the popularity of online social networks (OSNs). Companies may provide
incentives (e.g., via free samples of a product) to a small group of users in an OSN, and these users provide recommendations to their
friends, which eventually increases the overall sales of a given product. Nevertheless, this also opens a door for “malicious behaviors”:
dishonest users may intentionally give misleading recommendations to their friends so as to distort the normal sales distribution. In
this paper, we propose a detection framework to identify dishonest users in OSNs. In particular, we present a set of fully distributed
and randomized algorithms, and also quantify the performance of the algorithms by deriving probability of false positive, probability of
false negative, and the distribution of number of detection rounds. Extensive simulations are also carried out to illustrate the impact of
misleading recommendations and the effectiveness of our detection algorithms. The methodology we present here will enhance the
security level of viral marketing in OSNs.
Index Terms—Dishonest Recommenders, Misbehavior Detection, Distributed Algorithms, Online Social Networks
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
IN the past few years, we have witnessed an exponen-tial growth of user population in online social net-
works (OSNs). Popular OSNs such as Facebook, Twitter
and Taobao [1] have attracted millions of active users.
Moreover, due to the rapid development of intelligent
cell phones and their integration of online social net-
working services [37], [38], many users have integrated
these services into their daily activities, and they often
share various forms of information with each other.
For example, users share their opinions on purchased
products with their friends, and they may also receive
or even seek recommendations from their friends before
doing any purchase. Therefore, when one buys a prod-
uct, she may be able to influence her friends to do further
purchases. This type of influence between users in OSNs
is called the word-of-mouth effect, and it is also referred
as social influence.
Due to the large population and the strong social influ-
ence in OSNs, companies are also adapting a new way to
reach their potential customers. In particular, instead of
using the conventional broadcast-oriented advertisement
(e.g., through TV or newspaper), companies are now
using target-oriented advertisement which takes advan-
tage of the social influence so to attract users in OSNs
to do their purchases. This new form of advertisement
can be described as follows: firms first attract a small
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fraction of initial users in OSNs by providing free or
discounted samples, then rely on the word-of-mouth
effect to finally attract a large amount of buyers. As the
word-of-mouth effect spreads quickly in social networks,
this form of advertisement is called the viral marketing,
which is a proven and effective way to increase the sales
and revenue for companies [16], [19], [25], [33].
We like to emphasize that viral marketing in OSNs do
exist in the real world. One particular prime example is
the Taobao [1], which is one of the major operations un-
der the Alibaba group, and it is the biggest e-commerce
website in China. As of June 2013, Taobao has over 500
million registered users and 60 million of regular visitors
per day. It also hosts more than 800 million types of
products and represents 100 million dollars turnover per
year [5], [6]. Users can buy various types of products
from Taobao, and they can also run their own shops in
selling products. Moreover, Taobao also developed an
application addon called Friends Center on top of the
website. With this application addon, users in Taobao
can follow other users just like the following relationship
in Twitter, hence, an OSN is formed on top of this e-
commerce system. In this OSN, users can share many
types of information with their friends, including the
products they purchased, the shops they visited, as well
as the usage experiences or opinions on products or
shops. In particular, users can also forward their friends’
posts or even give comments. In addition to using the
Friends Center in Taobao, one can also associate her
Taobao account with her account in Sina Weibo [2],
[3], which is the biggest OSN in China. According to
Weibo’s prospectus, the monthly active users of Weibo
reached 143.8 million in March 2014, and the daily active
users also reached 66.6 million [7]. By associating Taobao
2account with Sina Weibo, users can easily share their
purchasing experience and ratings on products with
their friends in Weibo. Based on Taobao and Weibo,
many companies can easily perform target-oriented ad-
vertisement to promote their products. In fact, this type
of advertisement can be easily launched in any OSN.
However, the possibility of doing target-oriented ad-
vertisement in OSNs also opens a door for malicious
activities. Precisely, dishonest users in an OSN may
intentionally give misleading recommendations to their
neighbors, e.g., by giving high (low) rating on a low-
quality (high-quality) product. To take advantage of the
word-of-mouth effect, firms may also hire some users
in an OSN to promote their products. In fact, this type
of advertisement becomes very common in Taobao and
Weibo. Worse yet, companies may even consider paying
users to badmouth their competitors’ products. Due to
the misleading recommendations given by dishonest
users, even if a product is of low quality, people may
still be misled to purchase it. Furthermore, products of
high quality may lose out since some potential buyers
are diverted to other low-quality products.
As we will show in Section 7.2 via simulation, mislead-
ing recommendations made by dishonest users indeed
have a significant impact on the market share. In partic-
ular, a simple strategy of promoting one’s own product
while bad-mouthing competitors’ products can greatly
enhance the sales of one’s product. Furthermore, even if
a product is of low quality, hiring a small percentage of
users to promote it by providing misleading recommen-
dations can severely shift the market share on various
products. Therefore, it is of big significance to identify
dishonest users and remove them from the networks so
as to maintain the viability of viral marketing in OSNs.
With respect to the normal users in OSNs, it is also
of big interest to identify the dishonest users among
their neighbors so as to obtain more accurate recom-
mendations and make wiser decisions on purchasing
products. Motivated by this, this paper addresses the
problem of detecting dishonest recommenders in OSNs,
in particular, how can a normal user discover and identify
foes from a set of friends during a sequence of purchases?
However, it is not an easy task to accurately identify
dishonest users in OSNs. First, an OSN usually contains
millions of users, and the friendships among these users
are also very complicated, which can be indicated by
the high clustering coefficient of OSNs. Second, users
in an OSN interact with their friends very frequently,
which makes it difficult to identify dishonest users by
tracing and analyzing the behaviors of all users in a
centralized way. Last but not the least, in the scenario
of OSNs, honest users may also have malicious behav-
iors unintentionally, e.g., they may simply forward the
received misleading recommendations given by their
dishonest neighbors without awareness. Conversely, dis-
honest users may also act as honest ones sometimes so as
to confuse their neighbors and try to evade the detection.
Therefore, the distinction between dishonest users and
honest ones in terms of their behaviors becomes obscure,
which finally makes the detection more challenging.
To address the problem of identifying dishonest rec-
ommenders in OSNs, this work makes the following
contributions:
• We propose a fully distributed and randomized algo-
rithm to detect dishonest recommenders in OSNs.
In particular, users in an OSN can independently
execute the algorithm to distinguish their dishonest
neighbors from honest ones. We further exploit the
distributed nature of the algorithm by integrating
the detection results of neighbors so as to speed up
the detection, and also extend the detection algo-
rithm to handle network dynamics, in particular, the
“user churn” in OSNs.
• We provide theoretical analysis on quantifying the
performance of the detection algorithm, e.g., proba-
bility of false positive, probability of false negative,
and the distribution of time rounds needed to detect
dishonest users.
• We carry out extensive simulations to validate the
accuracy of the performance analysis, and further
validate the effectiveness of our detection algorithm
using a real dataset.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2,
we review related work and illustrate the difference of
detecting dishonest users in OSNs from that in general
recommender systems. In Section 3, we formulate the
type of recommendations and the behavior of users in
OSNs. In Section 4, we present the detection algorithm
in detail, and also provide theoretical analysis on the
performance of the algorithm. In Section 5, we develop
a cooperative algorithm to speed up the detection, and
in Section 6, we design a scheme to deal with the
network dynamics of OSNs. We demonstrate the severe
impact of misleading recommendations and validate the
effectiveness of the detection algorithms via simulations
in Section 7, and finally conclude the paper in Section 8.
2 RELATED WORK
A lot of studies focus on the information spreading effect
in OSNs, e.g., [22], [29], and results show that OSNs
are very beneficial for information spreading due to
their specific natures such as high clustering coefficient.
To take advantage of the easy-spreading nature and
the large population of OSNs, viral marketing which is
based on the word-of-mouth effect is becoming popular
and has been widely studied, e.g., [16], [19], [25], [33]. In
particular, because of the strong social influence in OSNs,
a small fraction of initial buyers can even attract a large
amount of users to finally purchase the product [29],
[39]. A major portion of viral marketing research thinks
viral marketing as an information diffusion process, and
then study the influence maximization problem, e.g.,
[22], [12]. However, viral marketing in OSNs also opens a
door for malicious behaviors as dishonest recommenders
3can easily inject misleading recommendations into the
system so to misguide normal users’ purchases.
In the aspect of maintaining system security, some
work like [34] considers to exploit the framework of trust
structure [11], [23], [36]. The rough idea is to compute
a trust value for every pair of nodes in distributed sys-
tems. This framework is suitable for building delegation
systems and reputation systems, while it still faces a
lot of challenges to address the problem of identifying
dishonest users in OSNs studied in this work. First,
OSNs usually contain millions of users and billions of
links, the cost on computing the trust values for every
pair of users must be extremely high. Second, even if the
trust values for every pair of users have been computed,
it still requires a mapping from the trust value to a tag
indicating whether a user is dishonest or not, which is
also a challenging task, especially when users have no
priori information about the number of dishonest users.
With respect to malicious behavior detection, it was
widely studied in wireless networks (e.g., [21], [35], [28]),
P2P networks (e.g., [30], [27]), general recommender sys-
tems [8] (e.g., [13], [14], [24]), and online rating systems
(e.g., [31], [17], [32]). Unlike previous works, in this
paper we address the problem of malicious behavior
detection in a different application scenario, online social
networks. In particular, we focus on the identification
of dishonest recommenders in OSNs, which is a very
different problem and also brings different challenges
even comparing to the problems of shill attack detection
in recommender systems and review spam detection
in online rating systems, both of which are considered
to be more similar to the problem we considered in
this paper. For example, every user in an OSN may
give recommendations to her friends, while this is to-
tally different from the case of recommender system
where recommendations are made only by the system
and are given to users in a centralized way. Second,
users’ ratings, i.e., the recommendations, may propa-
gate through the network for OSNs, while there is no
recommendation propagation in recommender systems.
And this forwarding behavior makes normal users in
OSNs also have the chance of doing malicious activi-
ties, e.g., forwarding neighbors’ misleading recommen-
dations without awareness. Last but not the least, an
OSN usually has an extremely large number of nodes
and links and also evolves dynamically, so a distributed
detection algorithm becomes necessary with the consid-
eration of the computation cost. However, this increases
the difficulty of the detection because the detector only
has the local information including her own purchasing
experience and the recommendations received from her
neighbors, but not the global information of the whole
network as in recommender systems. In terms of the
detection methodology, related work studying review
spam detection usually uses machine leaning techniques,
while our detection framework is based on suspicious set
shrinkage with distributed iterative algorithms.
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the model of OSNs
and give the formal definitions on different types of
recommendations, then we formalize the behaviors of
users in OSNs on how to provide recommendations.
In particular, considering that the objective of dishonest
users is to promote their target products and decrease the
chance of being detected, we formalize the behaviors of
dishonest users into a probabilistic strategy.
3.1 Modeling on Online Social Networks
We model an OSN as an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of nodes in the graph and E is the
set of undirected edges. Each node i ∈ V represents one
user in an OSN, and each link (i, j) ∈ E indicates the
friendship between user i and user j, i.e., user i is a
neighbor or friend of user j and vice versa. That is, user
i and user j can interact with each other via the link
(i, j), e.g., give recommendations to each other. Usually,
OSNs are scale-free [39], [29] and the degrees of nodes
follow power law distribution [9]. Precisely, p(k) ∝ k−γ ,
where p(k) is the probability of a randomly chosen node
in G having degree k and γ is a constant with a typical
value 2 < γ < 3. We denote Ni = {j|(i, j) ∈ E} as the
neighboring set of user i and assume that |Ni| = N .
3.2 Products and Recommendations
We first formalize products, and then give the definitions
of different types of recommendations. We consider a
set of “substitutable” products P1, P2, · · · , PM that are
produced by firms F1, F2, · · · , FM , respectively, and
these firms compete in the same market. Two products
are substitutable if they are compatible, e.g., polo shirts
from brand X and brand Y are substitutable goods
from the customers’ points of view. We characterize
each product Pj with two properties: (1) its sale price
and (2) users’ valuations. We assume that each product
Pj has a unique price which is denoted as pj . With
respect to users’ valuations, since different users may
have different ratings on a product because of their
subjectivity, we denote vij as the valuation of user i on
product Pj .
We categorize a product into two types according to
its sale price and users’ valuations. In particular, if user
i thinks that a product Pj is sold at the price that truly
reveals its quality, then she considers this product as a
trustworthy product. That is, product Pj is classified as a
trustworthy product by user i only when pj = vij . Here
the equal sign means that the product is sold at a fair
price from the point of view of user i. Conversely, if
user i thinks that the price of product Pj does not reveal
its quality, or formally, pj 6= vij , then she classifies it as
an untrustworthy product. Similarly, here the inequality
sign just means that user i thinks that Pj is priced
unfair, maybe much larger than its value. For example,
maybe this product is of low quality or even bogus, but
4it is produced by speculative and dishonest companies
who always seek to maximize their profit by cheating
customers. Formally, we use Ti(Pj) to denote the type
of product Pj classified by user i, and we have
Ti(Pj)=
{
1, if user i considers Pj to be trustworthy,
0, if user i considers Pj to be untrustworthy.
Since products are categorized into two types, we as-
sume that there are two types of recommendations: pos-
itive recommendations and negative recommendations,
which are denoted by RP (Pj) and R
N(Pj), respectively.
Definition 1: A positive recommendation on product Pj
(RP (Pj)) always claims that Pj is a trustworthy product
regardless of its type, while a negative recommendation on
Pj (R
N (Pj)) always claims that Pj is an untrustworthy
product regardless of its type. Formally, we have
RP (Pj) , “Pj is a trustworthy product”,
RN (Pj) , “Pj is an untrustworthy product”.
Note that a recommendation, either RP (Pj) or RN (Pj),
does not reveal the type of product Pj classified by users,
so one may make positive (or negative) recommenda-
tions even if she takes the product as an untrustwor-
thy (or a trustworthy) product. To have the notion of
correctness, we further classify recommendations into
correct recommendations and wrong recommendations
by integrating users’ valuations.
Definition 2: A recommendation on product Pj is cor-
rect for user i, which is denoted as RCi (Pj), only when it
reveals the type of Pj classified by user i, i.e., Ti(Pj),
while a wrong recommendation on product Pj for user
i (RWi (Pj)) reveals the opposite type of product Pj
classified by user i. Formally, we have
RCi (Pj),
{
RP (Pj), if Ti(Pj)=1,
RN (Pj), if Ti(Pj)=0.
RWi (Pj),
{
RP (Pj), if Ti(Pj)=0,
RN (Pj), if Ti(Pj)=1.
3.3 Behaviors of Users in OSNs
In this subsection, we formalize the behaviors of users
in an OSN. We assume that for any user, if she buys a
product, then she can valuate the product based on her
usage experience, and then categorizes it into either a
trustworthy product or an untrustworthy product from
her point of view.
Behaviors of honest users. We define honest users as
the ones who will not intentionally give wrong recom-
mendations. That is, if an honest user buys a product,
since she can valuate the product and determine its
type, she always gives correct recommendations on the
product to her neighbors. Precisely, she gives positive
recommendations if the product is considered to be
trustworthy and negative recommendations otherwise.
On the other hand, if an honest user did not buy
a product, she may also give recommendations to her
neighbors by simply forwarding the received recom-
mendations from other ones. This type of forwarding
behavior is quite common in OSNs. For example, in
Taobao and Weibo, many users forward their friends’
posts, including their purchasing experiences and ratings
on products. In a study of online social networks [4], it
was found that 25% of users had forwarded an adver-
tisement to other users in the network. Moreover, due
to the anonymity of users’ identities (e.g., users usually
use pseudo names to register their Weibo account), it
is extremely difficult to trace the information spreading
process in OSNs, and so users may simply forward any
form of information without confirming its truthfulness.
In particular, a user may forward a positive (nega-
tive) recommendation given by her neighbors without
validating the quality of the product. Because of this
forwarding behavior, it is possible that honest users may
give wrong recommendations to their neighbors. Thus,
a user who gives wrong recommendations is not strictly
dishonest, but only potentially dishonest. In other words,
if the detector considers a product to be trustworthy and
receives negative recommendations from a neighbor, she
still can not be certain that this neighbor is dishonest,
mainly because it is possible that this neighbor does not
intend to cheat, but is just misled by her neighbors.
Behaviors of dishonest users. We define dishonest
users as the ones who may give wrong recommendations
intentionally, e.g., give positive recommendations on an
untrustworthy product. Note that dishonest users may
also behave differently as they may aim for promoting
different products, e.g., users who are hired by firm
Fi aim for promoting product Pi, while users who are
hired by firm Fj aim for promoting Pj . Without loss
of generality, we assume that there are m types of
dishonest users who are hired by firms F1, F2, · · · , Fm,
and they promote products P1, P2, · · · , Pm, respectively.
Furthermore, we assume that the products promoted
by dishonest users (i.e., products P1, P2, · · · , Pm) are
untrustworthy for all users. The intuition is that these
products are of low quality (or even bogus) so that they
can be easily identified by people. The main reason to
make this assumption is that in this case dishonest users
have incentives to promote these products for a larger
profit, meanwhile, honest users also have incentives to
detect such dishonest users so as to avoid purchasing
untrustworthy products. To further illustrate this, note
that when users in an OSN are attracted to buy a
product promoted by dishonest users, if the product is
a trustworthy one, then there is no difference for these
buyers to purchase other trustworthy products instead
of the one promoted by dishonest users, and so honest
users have no incentive to identify the dishonest users
who promote trustworthy products. In other words,
promoting trustworthy products can be regarded as
normal behaviors, so we only focus on the case where
the promoted products are untrustworthy in this paper.
However, we would like to point out that when we
model the behaviors of dishonest users in the following,
5we allow dishonest users to behave as honest ones and
give correct recommendations.
Recall that the goal of dishonest users is to attract as
many users as possible to purchase the product they
promote, one simple and intuitive strategy to achieve
this goal is to give positive recommendations on the
product they promote and negative recommendations on
all other products. On the other hand, besides attracting
as many users as possible to buy their promoted product,
dishonest users also hope to avoid being detected so
that they can perform malicious activities for a long
time. Therefore, dishonest users may also adopt a more
intelligent strategy so to confuse the detector and de-
crease the chance of being detected. For instance, instead
of always bad-mouthing other products by giving neg-
ative recommendations, they may probabilistically give
correct recommendations and behave like honest users
sometimes. The benefit of this probabilistic strategy is
to make the detection more difficult so that dishonest
users may hide in a longer time. In this paper, we allow
dishonest users to adopt this intelligent strategy and use
Slj to denote the one adopted by a type-l (1 ≤ l ≤ m)
dishonest user j. Moreover, we allow dishonest users to
be more powerful by assuming that they know honest
users’ valuation on each product so that they can mislead
as many users as possible. The intelligent strategy Slj can
be formally expressed as follows.
Slj,R
P (Pl)∧
[
∧Mn=1,n6=l
[
δRCj (Pn) ∨ (1−δ)R
N(Pn)
] ]
, (1)
where δ denotes the probability of giving correct rec-
ommendations. Recall that the goal of type-l dishonest
users is to attract as many users as possible to purchase
product Pl, while giving positive recommendations on
other products (say Pn, n 6= l) goes against their objec-
tive, so we assume that dishonest users only give correct
recommendations on Pn with a small probability, i.e., δ
is small. In particular, δ = 0 implies that dishonest users
always bad-mouth other products.
Note that there is a possibility that dishonest users do
not adopt the probabilistic strategy as in Equation (1),
while choose to promote trustworthy products over a
long time just to create a good reputation, and then
behave maliciously by giving misleading recommenda-
tions on a product. However, as long as the dishonest
users start performing malicious activities, our detection
framework still provides us with the opportunity of
detecting them as we can keep executing the detection
algorithm continuously. On the other hand, even if our
framework may fail to detect the dishonest users if they
only perform malicious activities in a very limited num-
ber of rounds, the effect of misleading recommendations
given by dishonest users is also very limited, and so the
corresponding miss detection error should be very small.
Another possibility we would like to point out is
that multiple dishonest users may collude and a single
dishonest user may also create multiple Sybil accounts
to consistently promote a low-quality product. This type
of collaborated malicious attack is still detectable under
our framework, this is because our detection framework
is fully distributed and when the detector determines
whether a neighbor is dishonest or not, she only relies
on her own valuation on a product and the recommen-
dation given by this neighbor. Therefore, the possibility
of a dishonest user being detected only depends on
the amount of malicious activities she performs, and
it is irrelevant to other users’ behaviors. However, for
the cooperative detection algorithm that is developed
for speeding up the detection, dishonest users may
evade the detection if they collude as the detector may
determine the type of a neighbor by exploiting other
neighbors’ detection information, while the possibility
of evading the detection depends on the parameters
controlled by the detector. Hence, there is a tradeoff
between detection accuracy and detection efficiency, and
we will further illustrate this in Section 5.
3.4 Problem
In this paper, we develop distributed algorithms that can
be run at any user in an OSN to identify her dishonest
neighbors. Specifically, we first develop a randomized
baseline algorithm which only exploits the information
of the detector, see Section 4 for details. We also quantify
the performance of the algorithm via theoretical analysis.
Then we propose a cooperative algorithm which further
takes advantage of the detection results of the detector’s
neighbors so as to speed up the detection, see Section 5
for details. After that, we further extend the algorithm
to deal with network dynamics of OSNs, i.e., user churn,
in Section 6.
4 BASELINE DETECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, we first illustrate the rough idea of the
detection framework, and then present the detection al-
gorithm in detail. We also quantify various performance
measures of the algorithm.
4.1 General Detection Framework
Our detection algorithm is fully distributed, and so users
can independently execute it to identify dishonest users
among their neighbors. Without loss of generality, we
only focus on one particular user, say user i, and call
her the detector. That is, we present the algorithm from
the perspective of user i and discuss how to detect her
dishonest neighbors. For ease of presentation, we sim-
ply call a product as a trustworthy (or untrustworthy)
product if the detector considers it to be trustworthy (or
untrustworthy).
Note that even if users’ subjectivity creates different
preferences on different products, we assume that the de-
tector and her neighbors have a consistent valuation on
most products. This assumption is reasonable, especially
for the cases where the quality of products can be easily
identified, and its rationality can be further justified as
6follows. First, users in an OSN prefer to have friends
with others who share similar interests and tastes. Hence
users in an OSN are similar to their neighbors [15] and
so they have a consistent valuation with their neighbors
on many products. Secondly, “wisdom of the crowd” is
considered to be the basis of online rating systems like
Amazon and Epinions, and it is also widely used by
people in their daily lives, so it is reasonable to assume
that most products have intrinsic quality so that the
detector and her neighbors will have a consistent rating.
Note that the above assumption allows users who are
not friends with each other to have very different valua-
tions on the same product, and it also allows the detector
and her neighbors to have different valuations on some
products. In fact, if an honest neighbor has a different
rating on a product, then from the detector’s point of
view, it is just equivalent to the case where this honest
neighbor is misled by dishonest users and so gives a
wrong recommendation. Another issue we would like
to point out is that even if the above assumption does
not hold, e.g., if the detector and her neighbors have
different ratings on all products, our detection frame-
work still provides a significant step toward identifying
dishonest behavior in OSNs’ advertisement. This is because
if a neighbor has different valuations on all products
from the detector, then our detection framework will
take this neighbor as “misleading” no matter she intends
to cheat or not. This is acceptable as users always prefer
neighbors to have the similar taste (or preference) with
them so that they can purchase a product they really like
if they take their neighbors’ recommendations.
We model the purchase experience of detector i as a
discrete time process. Particularly, we take the duration
between two continuous purchases made by detector i
as one round, and time proceeds in rounds t = 1, 2, · · · .
That is, round t is defined as the duration from the
time right before the tth purchase instance to the time
right before the (t+1)th purchase instance. Based on this
definition, detector i purchases only one product at each
round, while she may receive various recommendations
on the product from her neighbors, e.g., some neighbors
may give her positive recommendations and others may
give her negative recommendations.
The general idea of our detection framework can be
illustrated as in Figure 1. Initially, detector i is conserva-
tive and considers all her neighbors as potentially dishon-
est users. We use Si(t) to denote the set of potentially
dishonest neighbors of detector i until round t, which
is termed as the suspicious set, and we have Si(0) = Ni.
As time proceeds, detector i differentiates her neighbors
based on their behaviors in each round, and shrinks the
suspicious set by removing her trusted neighbors which
are classified as honest users. After sufficient number
of rounds, one can expect that all honest neighbors are
removed from the suspicious set and only dishonest
neighbors left. Therefore, after t rounds, detector i takes a
neighbor as dishonest if and only if this neighbor belongs
to the suspicious set Si(t).
t
...
0 1 2
dishonest user
honest user
Si(0) = Ni
Si(1)
Si(2)
Fig. 1: General detection process via suspicious set
shrinkage.
4.2 Operations in One Round
In this subsection, we describe the detailed operations
of shrinking the suspicious set in only one round, say
round t. Note that detector i buys a product at round t,
which we denote as Pjt (jt ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,M}), so she can
valuate the product and determine its type Ti(Pjt) from
her point of view. Moreover, she can further categorize
the received recommendations (that are either positive
or negative) into correct recommendations and wrong
recommendations based on her valuation on the product,
and so she can differentiate her neighbors according
to their recommendations. Specifically, we define NCi (t)
as the set of neighbors whose recommendations given
at round t are classified as correct by detector i. Ac-
cordingly, we denote NWi (t) and N
N
i (t) as the set of
neighbors who give detector i wrong recommendations
and no recommendation at round t, respectively. We
have Ni = NCi (t) ∪ N
W
i (t) ∪N
N
i (t).
Recall that a product is either trustworthy or untrust-
worthy, so detector i faces two cases at round t: (1)
the purchased product Pjt is an untrustworthy product,
i.e., Ti(Pjt) = 0, and (2) the purchased product Pjt is a
trustworthy product, i.e., Ti(Pjt) = 1. In the following,
we illustrate on how to shrink the suspicious set in the
above two cases.
In the first case, a neighbor who gives correct recom-
mendations can not be certainly identified as honest,
mainly because a dishonest neighbor may also give
correct recommendations. For example, a type-l (l 6= jt)
dishonest user may give negative recommendations on
product Pjt based on the intelligent strategy, and this
recommendation will be classified as correct as the de-
tector valuates product Pjt as an untrustworthy product.
Therefore, detector i is not able to differentiate honest
neighbors from dishonest ones if Ti(Pjt) = 0. We adopt
a conservative policy by keeping the suspicious set
unchanged, i.e., Si(t) = Si(t− 1).
In the second case, since detector i valuates product
Pjt as a trustworthy product, Pjt cannot be a prod-
uct promoted by dishonest users, and we have Pjt ∈
{Pm+1, ..., PM}. In this case, even if a dishonest user may
give correct recommendations on product Pjt based on
the intelligent strategy, the corresponding probability δ
is considered to be small, and so a dishonest user should
belong to the set NWi (t) with high probability. Note that
it is also possible that dishonest users do not make any
recommendation at round t, so dishonest users can be in
7either NWi (t) or N
N
i (t). We use D(t) to denote the union
of the two sets, i.e., D(t) = NWi (t) ∪ N
N
i (t), which de-
notes the set to which dishonest users belong with high
probability at round t. To balance the tradeoff between
detection accuracy and detection rate, we employ a ran-
domized policy that only shrinks the suspicious set with
probability p. Precisely, we let Si(t) = Si(t−1)∩D(t) only
with probability p. Here p is a tunable parameter chosen
by detector i, and it reflects the degree of conservatism
of the detector. The detailed algorithm which is referred
as the randomized detection algorithm at round t is stated
in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Randomized Detection Algorithm at Round
t for Detector i
1: Estimate the type of the purchased product Pjt ;
2: Differentiate neighbors by determining NCi (t),
NWi (t), and N
N
i (t);
3: Let D(t)← NWi (t) ∩N
N
i (t);
4: if Ti(Pjt) = 1 then
5: with probability p: Si(t)← Si(t− 1) ∩D(t);
6: with probability 1− p: Si(t)← Si(t− 1);
7: else
8: Si(t)← Si(t− 1);
9: end if
To further illustrate the detection process in Algo-
rithm 1, we consider Figure 2 as an example to show
the operations at round t. User i have seven neighbors
that are labeled from a to g. Assume that two of them
are dishonest (i.e., user a and b). Suppose that neighbors
a, b, c and e are still in the suspicious set before round t,
i.e., Si(t−1) = {a, b, c, e}. We use dashed cycles to denote
suspicious users in Figure 2. If user i buys a trustworthy
product at round t, and only neighbors e and f give
her correct recommendations, then user i can be certain
that neighbor e is honest with a high probability and
it can be removed from the suspicious set. Therefore,
according to Algorithm 1, the suspicious set shrinks with
probability p, and if this probabilistic even happens, then
we have Si(t) = {a, b, c} as shown on the right hand side
of Figure 2.
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NNi (t) = {a, g}
NCi (t) = {e, f}
dishonest user honest user suspicious user
with probability p
Fig. 2: An example illustrating Algorithm 1.
Note that Algorithm 1 is fully distributed in the sense
that it can be executed by any user to identify her dis-
honest neighbors. The benefit of the distributed nature is
twofold. First, the size of an OSN is usually very large,
e.g., it may contain millions of nodes and billions of
links, so a distributed algorithm becomes necessary so as
to make the computation feasible. Second, an OSN itself
is fully distributed, in particular, a user in an OSN only
receives information, e.g., recommendations on prod-
ucts, from her direct neighbors, and so she only needs to
care about the honesty of her neighbors so as to make the
received recommendations more accurate. Therefore, a
fully distributed detection algorithm is indeed necessary
for the application we consider.
In terms of the implementation of Algorithm 1, it
can be deployed as a third-party application just like
others that are deployed in OSNs. In particular, when
this application has been deployed in an OSN, each user
has a choice to install it or not. If a user chooses to install
it, then she needs to submit some necessary information
to the social network provider continuously, e.g., her
ratings on products and the recommendations that she
would like to make, and the provider will aggregate
and store the information for each user. Finally, the
computation can be done by either the server of the
social network provider or the client computer of each
user.
4.3 Performance Evaluation
To characterize the performance of the detection algo-
rithm, we define three performance measures: (1) prob-
ability of false negative which is denoted as Pfn(t), (2)
probability of false positive which is denoted as Pfp(t), and
(3) the number of rounds needed to shrink the suspicious set
until it only contains dishonest users, which is denoted by a
random variable R. Specifically, Pfn(t) characterizes the
probability that a dishonest user is wrongly regarded as
an honest one after t rounds, and Pfp(t) characterizes
the error that an honest user is wrongly regarded as a
dishonest one after t rounds. Recall that detector i takes a
neighbor j ∈ Ni as dishonest if and only if this neighbor
belongs to the suspicious set (i.e., j ∈ Si(t)), so we define
Pfn(t) as the probability that a dishonest neighbor of
detector i is not in Si(t) after t rounds. Formally, we
have
Pfn(t) =
# of dishonest neighbors of i that are not in Si(t)
total # of dishonest neighbors of detector i
.
(2)
On the other hand, since all neighbors of detector i are
initially included in the suspicious set (i.e., Si(0) = Ni),
an honest user is wrongly regarded as a dishonest one
only if she still remains in the suspicious set after t
rounds. Thus, we define Pfp(t) as the probability of an
honest user not being removed from the suspicious set
after t rounds. Formally, we have
Pfp(t) =
# of honest neighbors of i that are in Si(t)
total # of honest neighbors of detector i
.
(3)
To derive the above three performance measures for
Algorithm 1, note that the suspicious set shrinks at
8round t only when detector i valuates her purchased
product as a trustworthy product and this round is
further used for detection with probability p. We call
such a round a detectable round and use a 0-1 random
variable d(t) as an indicator, where d(t) = 1 means that
round t is detectable and 0 otherwise. In addition to
the indicator d(t), detector i also obtains the set D(t) to
which dishonest users may belong at round t. Therefore,
we use a tuple (d(t),D(t)) to denote the information that
detector i obtains at round t, and the set of all tuples until
round t constitute the detection history, which we denote
as H(t). Formally, we have
H(t) = {(d(1),D(1)), (d(2),D(2)), ..., (d(t),D(t))}.
Based on the detection history H(t), the performance
measures of Pfn(t), Pfp(t) and the distribution of R for
Algorithm 1 can be derived as in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: After running Algorithm 1 for t rounds, prob-
ability of false negative and probability of false positive are
derived in Equation (4) and Equation (5), respectively.
Pfn(t) = 1− (1− δ)
∑t
τ=1
d(τ)
, (4)
Pfp(t) ≈
t∏
τ=1,d(τ)=1
|D(τ − 1) ∩ D(τ)|
|D(τ − 1)|
, (5)
where D(0) = Ni and D(τ) is set as D(τ − 1) if d(τ) = 0.
The number of rounds needed for detection until the suspicious
set only contains dishonest users follows the distribution of
P (R=r)=
r∑
d=1
(
r − 1
d− 1
)
(pd)
d(1−pd)
r−d ×
[
[1−(1−phc)
d]N−k−[1−(1−phc)
d−1]N−k
]
,(6)
where phc is the average probability of an honest user giving
correct recommendations at each round and pd is the proba-
bility of a round being detectable, which can be estimated by
Equation (9) and Equation (10) in the Appendix, respectively.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
Since probability of false positive Pfp(t) is critical to
design the complete detection algorithm (see Section 4.4),
we use an example to further illustrate its derivation.
Note that a user in an OSN usually has a large number
of friends, so we let detector i have 100 neighbors labeled
from 1 to 100. Among these 100 neighbors, we assume
that the last two are dishonest, whose labels are 99 and
100. Before starting the detection algorithm, we initialize
D(0) as Ni and let Pfp(0) = 1.
In the first detection round, suppose that user i
buys a trustworthy product and further takes this
round as detectable. Besides, suppose that only neighbor
1 and neighbor 2 give her correct recommendations,
i.e., D(1) = {3, 4, · · · , 100}, then we have Si(1) =
{3, 4, · · · , 100}. Based on Equation (5), the probability of
false positive can be derived as
Pfp(1) = Pfp(0) ∗
|D(0) ∩ D(1)|
|D(0)|
= 0.98.
Note that according to the definition in Equation (3),
the accurate value of probability of false positive is
96
98 , which is a little bit smaller than the result derived
by Theorem 1. In fact, Theorem 1 provides a good
approximation when the number of neighbors is large
and the number of dishonest users among them is small,
which is the common case for OSNs as users often tend
to have a lot of friends and a company can only control
a small number of users to promote its product.
Now let us consider the second detection round.
Suppose that the event with probability p does not
happen. That is, this round is not detectable. So we set
D(2) = D(1), and the suspicious set remains the same,
i.e., Si(2) = Si(1) = {3, 4, · · · , 100}. The probability of
false positive is still
Pfp(2) = 0.98.
We further examine one more round. Suppose that the
third round is detectable and neighbor 1 to neighbor
4 give user i correct recommendations, i.e., D(3) =
{5, · · · , 100}. Based on Algorithm 1, we have Si(3) =
Si(2) ∩ D(3) = {5, · · · , 100}. The probability of false
positive can be derived as
Pfp(3) = Pfp(2) ∗
|D(2) ∩ D(3)|
|D(2)|
= 0.96.
Note that according to the definition in Equation (3), the
accurate value after round t is 9498 = 0.959.
Based on Theorem 1, we see that Pfp(t) → 0, and
this implies that all honest users will be removed from
the suspicious set eventually. However, Pfn(t) does not
converge to zero, which implies that dishonest users may
evade the detection. Fortunately, as long as Pfn(t) is not
too large when Pfp(t) converges to zero, one can still
effectively identify all dishonest users (as we will show
in Section 7) by executing the detection process multiple
times. On the other hand, the expectation of R quantifies
the efficiency of the detection algorithm, in particular,
it indicates how long a detector needs to identify her
dishonest neighbors on average. Note that the detection
algorithm itself does not rely on the derivation of this
performance measure, and it is just used for studying
the detection efficiency of the algorithm.
4.4 Complete Detection Algorithm
In Section 4.2, we present a partial detection algorithm
which describes the operations in a particular round t. In
this subsection, we present the corresponding complete
algorithm which describes how to shrink the suspicious
set until dishonest users can be identified. To achieve
this, we have to determine the termination condition
when repeating the partial algorithm round by round.
Observe that after executing the detection algorithm for
t rounds, only users in the suspicious set Si(t) are taken
as dishonest ones. Intuitively, to avoid a big detection
error, the detection process can only be terminated when
users in Si(t) are really dishonest with high probability.
9Based on the definition of probability of false positive
Pfp(t), it is sufficient to terminate the algorithm when
Pfp(t) is lower than a predefined small threshold P
∗
fp.
In other words, as long as probability of false positive
is small enough, we can guarantee that all users in the
suspicious set are really dishonest with high probability.
Based on the above illustration, the complete detection
algorithm can be stated as follows.
Algorithm 2 Complete Detection Algorithm
1: t← 0;
2: Si(0)← Ni;
3: repeat
4: t← t+ 1;
5: Derive the suspicious set Si(t) at round t by exe-
cuting Algorithm 1;
6: Update probability of false positive Pfp(t);
7: until Pfp(t) ≤ P ∗fp
8: Take users in Si(t) as dishonest and blacklist them;
5 COOPERATIVE ALGORITHM TO SPEED UP
THE DETECTION
In the last section, we propose a distributed and ran-
domized algorithm that only exploits the detector’s local
information. By running this algorithm, honest users can
detect their dishonest neighbors simultaneously and in-
dependently. That is, each user in an OSN maintains her
own suspicious set containing her potentially dishonest
neighbors. Since users in an OSN interact with each other
frequently, they can also share their detection results,
e.g., their suspicious sets. By doing this, a detector can
further exploit her neighbors’ detection history to speed
up her own detection, and we term this scenario as
cooperative detection.
We still focus on a particular detector, say user i, and
use Si(t) to denote her suspicious set. At round t, user i
may shrink her suspicious set based on her purchasing
experience and her received recommendations, and she
may also request the detection results of her neighbors.
In particular, we assume that detector i can obtain two
sets from each neighbor j at round t: the neighboring set
and the suspicious set of neighbor j, which we denote
as Nj and Sj(t), respectively.
To exploit neighbors’ detection results, at round t,
detector i first shrinks her own suspicious set according
to Algorithm 1, and we call this step as the independent
detection step. After that, detector i further shrinks her
suspicious set by exploiting the information received
from her neighbors (i.e., {(Nj ,Sj(t)), j ∈ Ni}), and
we term this step as the cooperative detection step. Since
detector i may have different degrees of trust on her
neighbors, we use wij(t) (0 ≤ wij(t) ≤ 1) to denote
the weight of trust of user i on neighbor j at round
t. That is, user i only exploits the detection results of
neighbor j with probability wij(t) at round t. Intuitively,
wij(t) = 1 implies that user i fully trusts neighbor j,
while wij(t) = 0 means that user i does not trust j at all.
The cooperative detection algorithm for user i at round
t is stated in Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3 Cooperative Detection Algorithm at Round
t for Detector i
1: Derive the suspicious set Si(t) based on local infor-
mation (i.e., using Algorithm 1);
2: Exchange detection results with neighbors;
3: for each neighbor j ∈ Ni do
4: with probability wij(t): Si(t)← Si(t)\(Nj\Sj(t));
5: with probability 1− wij(t): Si(t)← Si(t);
6: end for
We take Figure 3 as an example to further illustrate the
operations at the cooperative detection step (i.e., Line 3-6
in Algorithm 3). Since user i first shrinks her suspicious
set by using Algorithm 1, we still use the setting in
Figure 2 where Si(t) shrinks to {a, b, c} after the first
step. Now to further exploit neighbors’ detection results
to shrink Si(t), suppose that only user c is a neighbor
of user d, and it has already been removed from user
d’s suspicious set. That is, c ∈ Nd and c /∈ Sd. If user i
fully trusts neighbor d (i.e., wid(t) = 1), then user i can
be certain that neighbor c is honest as c is identified as
honest by neighbor d. Thus, user i can further shrink her
suspicious set, and we have Si(t) = {a, b} as shown on
the right hand side of Figure 3.
i
b
c
d
g
f
e
a
Si(t)← Si(t−1)∩(N
W
i (t)∪N
N
i (t)) = {a, b, c}
dishonest user honest user suspicious user
i
b
c
d
g
f
e
a
Si(t)← Si(t)\(Nd\Sd) = {a, b}
Cooperative detection step
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Fig. 3: An example illustrating Algorithm 3.
To implement Algorithm 3, we need to set the weights
of trust on different neighbors, i.e., wij(t). One simple
strategy is only trusting the neighbors that are not in
the suspicious set as users in the suspicious set are
potentially dishonest. Mathematically, we can express
this strategy as follows.
wij(t) =
{
0, if j ∈ Si(t),
1, otherwise.
(7)
Note that wij(t) is a tunable parameter for detector i,
and it affects the shrinking rate of the suspicious set
of detector i. On the other hand, since detector i may
further shrink her suspicious set by exploiting her neigh-
bors’ detection results, dishonest users may evade the
detection if they collude, while the possibility also de-
pends on the parameter wij(t). In fact, there is a tradeoff
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between detection accuracy and efficiency when choos-
ing this parameter. Specifically, larger wij(t)’s imply that
detector i is more aggressive to further exploit her neigh-
bors’ detection results, and so the detection rate should
be larger, while the risk of dishonest users evading the
detection also becomes larger.
Again, Algorithm 3 is only a partial algorithm that
describes the operation at round t. To develop the com-
plete version of the cooperative detection algorithm, we
can still use the idea in Section 4.4 to set the termination
condition. That is, we keep running Algorithm 3 until
probability of false positive is less than a predefined
threshold P ∗fp. To achieve this, we have to derive the
probability of false positive Pfp(t) for Algorithm 3, and
the result is stated in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: After running Algorithm 3 for t rounds, prob-
ability of false positive can be derived as follows.
Pfp(t) ≈
Pfp(t− 1)
|D(t−1)∩D(t)|
|D(t−1)| N − |C(t)|
N
,
where Pfp(0) = 1 and C(t) denotes the set of neighbors
that are removed from the suspicious set in the cooper-
ative detection step at round t.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
6 ALGORITHM DEALING WITH USER CHURN
In previous sections, we proposed a randomized detec-
tion algorithm and also discussed about how to speed
up the detection. These algorithms are designed based
on the assumption that the underlying network is static,
i.e., the friendships between users are fixed and do not
change during the detection. However, an online social
network usually evolves dynamically, in particular, new
users may join in the network and existing users may
change their friendships or even leave the network by
deleting their profiles [18], [26], [40]. Taking the the
network dynamics into consideration, for detector i, new
users may become her friends and existing friends may
also disconnect with her at some time. We call these
behaviors as user churn. Note that even if users may
leave the network and rejoin it after some time, while
they may not be able to recover the past friendships
as establishing links or friendships usually requires the
confirmation of other users in OSNs. In this section, we
extend our detection algorithm to address the problem
of user churn in OSNs.
We still focus on a particular detector, say user i. At
each round, we first employ previous algorithms, e.g.,
Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 3, to shrink the suspicious
set. After that, we do the following checks: (1) whether
there are new users becoming the neighbors of detector
i, and (2) whether some existing neighbors of detector i
disconnect with her. In particular, if new neighbors come
in, we add them into the neighboring set Ni and the
suspicious set Si(t). In other words, we are conservative
to take new users as potentially dishonest. For ease of
presentation, we use NU(t) to denote the set of new users
that become the neighbors of detector i at round t. On the
other hand, if some existing neighbors disconnect with
detector i at round t, we simply remove them from both
the neighboring set Ni and the suspicious set Si(t). We
use L(t) to denote the set of neighbors that leave detector
i at round t, and use LS(t) to denote the set of users
that are in the suspicious set Si(t) and leave detector i
at round t, i.e., LS(t) = Si(t)∩L(t). Now we present the
detailed detection algorithm at round t in Algorithm 4.
Note that if Algorithm 3 is used to shrink the suspicious
set in Algorithm 4, then cooperative detection is used to
speed up the detection.
Algorithm 4 Dealing with User Churn at Round t
1: Derive the suspicious set Si(t) (by executing Algo-
rithm 1 or Algorithm 3);
2: Derive the set NU(t) and L(t);
3: Si(t)← (Si(t) ∪ NU(t))\L(t);
4: Ni ← (Ni ∪ NU(t))\L(t);
Let us use an example to illustrate the operations
in Algorithm 4 and it is shown in Figure 4. Since the
suspicious set first shrinks by using Algorithm 1 or
Algorithm 3, which has been illustrated before. Here we
only show the step dealing with user churn (i.e., Line 2-
4). Suppose that at round t, user i disconnects with
neighbor b (i.e., L(t) = {b}), and initiates a connection
with a new user that is labeled as h (i.e., NU(t) = {h}),
then user i can safely remove b from the suspicious set
as she does not care user b any more, while she has no
priori information about the type of the new user h, so
she is conservative and add user h into the suspicious
set. Thus, we have Si(t) = {a, h} as shown in Figure 4.
dishonest user honest user suspicious user
i
c
d
g
f
e
a
Si(t)← Si(t) ∪ NU(t)\L(t) = {a, h}
Step handling user churni
b
c
d
g
f
e
a
Si(t)← Si(t)\(Nd\Sd) = {a, b}
h h
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Fig. 4: An example illustrating Algorithm 4.
The complete algorithm can also be developed by
keeping running the detection process until probability
of false positive is smaller than a predefined threshold
P ∗fp. Thus, we have to derive the probability of false
positive Pfp(t) for Algorithm 4, and the result is stated
in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: After running Algorithm 4 for t rounds, prob-
ability of false positive can be derived as follows.
Pfp(t)≈
Pfp(t−1)
|D(t−1)∩D(t)|
|D(t−1)|
N(t−1)−|C(t)|+|NU (t)|−|LS(t)|
N(t)
,
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where Pfp(0) = 1 and N(t) denotes the number of
neighbors after round t.
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
7 SIMULATION AND MODEL VALIDATION
Our model aims to detect dishonest users who intention-
ally give wrong recommendations in OSNs. Since each
user in an OSN performs her own activities continuously,
e.g., purchasing a product, giving recommendations to
her neighbors, and making decisions on which product
to purchase, the network evolves dynamically. There-
fore, we first synthesize a dynamically evolving social
network to emulate users’ behaviors, then we show
the impact of misleading recommendations and validate
the analysis of our detection algorithm based on the
synthetic network. We also validate the effectiveness of
our detection algorithm using a real dataset drawn from
an online rating network.
7.1 Synthesizing A Dynamically Evolving OSN
In this subsection, we synthesize a dynamic OSN to
simulate the behaviors of users in the network. To
achieve this, we make assumptions on (1) how users
make recommendations to their neighbors, (2) how users
make decisions on purchasing which product, and (3)
how fast the recommendations spread.
First, there are two types of users in the network:
honest users and dishonest users. Dishonest users adopt
the intelligent strategy to make recommendations. For
an honest user, if she buys a product, she gives correct
recommendations to her friends based on her valuation
on the product. On the other hand, even if an honest user
does not buy a product, she still gives recommendations
based on her received recommendations. We adopt the
majority rule in this case. That is, if more than half of her
neighbors give positive (negative) recommendations to
her, then she gives positive (negative) recommendations
to others. Otherwise, she does not give any recommen-
dation. In the simulation, we let all honest users have
the same valuation on each product, and so we randomly
choose an honest user as the detector in each simulation.
Second, to simulate the behaviors of users on deciding
to purchase which product, we assume that an honest
user buys the product with the maximum number of
effective recommendations that is defined as the number
of positive recommendations subtracting the number
of negative recommendations. The rationale is that one
buys a product that receives high ratings as many as
possible and low ratings as few as possible.
Last, we assume that the spreading rate of recom-
mendations is much higher than the purchasing rate.
In other words, when one gives a positive (negative)
recommendation on a particular product to her neigh-
bors, her neighbors update their states accordingly, i.e.,
update the number of received positive (negative) rec-
ommendations. If the corresponding numbers satisfy the
majority rule, then they further make recommendations
on this product, and this process continues until no one
in the system can make a recommendation according to
the majority rule. Moreover, the whole process finishes
before the next purchase instance made by any user in
the network.
To model the evolution of the network, we assume
that it starts from the “uniform” state in which all prod-
ucts have the same market share. During one detection
round, 10%|V | purchase instances happen, where |V | is
the total number of users in the network, i.e., between
two successive purchases of detector i, 10%|V | purchases
are made by other users in the network. Note that the
assumptions we make in this subsection are only for the
simulation purpose, and our detection algorithms do not
require these assumptions.
7.2 Impact of Misleading Recommendations
In this subsection, we show the impact of misleading
recommendations using the synthetic network. We em-
ploy the GLP model proposed in [10] that is based
on preferential attachment [9] to generate a scale-free
graph with power law degree distribution and high
clustering coefficient. We generate a graph with around
8,000 nodes and 70,000 edges, whose clustering coeffi-
cient is around 0.3. We assume that initially no product
has been purchased, and consider 10,000 purchase in-
stances in the simulation. For each purchase instance,
one user purchases and she buys the product with the
maximum number of effective recommendations. After
that, she gives a recommendation on the product to
her friends. The recommendation will spread throughout
the network until no one can make a recommendation
according to the majority rule. We assume that there
are five products, P1, · · · , P5, and dishonest users aim to
promote product P1 which is an untrustworthy product,
while the rest are trustworthy products. Our objective
is to measure the fraction of purchases of each product
out of the total 10,000 purchases. We run the simulation
multiple times and take the average value.
1 2 3 4 50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
product ID
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 p
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
 
 
 5% dishonest users
 no dishonest users
Fig. 5: Impact of misleading recommendations on the
market share distribution: dishonest users aim to pro-
mote an untrustworthy product P1.
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The simulation results are shown in Figure 5. First, we
can see that if no dishonest user exists in the network
to give misleading recommendations, the untrustworthy
product P1 is purchased with only a small probability.
The reason why the probability is non-zero is that if a
user does not receive any recommendation, she simply
makes a random choice over the five products to make
a purchase. However, if we randomly set 5% of users
as dishonest and let them adopt the intelligent strategy
to promote P1 by setting δ = 0, then even if P1 is
an untrustworthy product, it is still purchased with
probability around 0.15. In other words, many users in
the network are misled by these dishonest users to pur-
chase P1. In summary, the existence of dishonest users
who intentionally give misleading recommendations can
severely distort the market share distribution.
7.3 Analysis Validation via A Synthetical OSN
In this subsection, we synthesize a dynamically evolving
network based on the description in Section 7.1, and then
validate our analysis on the performance of the detection
algorithms. In the simulation, we randomly select 5%
of users as dishonest users, and let them adopt the
intelligent strategy. We also randomly choose an honest
user who has dishonest neighbors and take her as the
detector. We carry out the simulation many times and
take the average value as the simulation results.
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Fig. 6: Probability of false negative and probability of
false positive of the randomized detection algorithm
(Algorithm 1) where δ = 0.1 and p = 0.8.
Let us first focus on the performance measures of
Pfn(t) and Pfp(t) for Algorithm 1. The theoretic results
and simulation results are shown in Figure 6. First, we
can see that the theoretic results match well with the
simulation results. Second, one only needs to run the
detection algorithm for a small number of rounds to
remove all honest users from the suspicious set, which
shows the effectiveness and efficiency of the detection
algorithm. However, probability of false negative is
not zero as dishonest users may act as honest ones
sometimes with the hope of evading the detection. This
implies that only a part of dishonest users are detected
in one execution of the algorithm. Fortunately, when
probability of false positive goes to zero, probability
of false negative is still not close to one. Therefore, to
detect all dishonest users, one can run the algorithm
multiple times. At each time, a subset of dishonest users
are detected and then removed. Eventually, all dishonest
users can be identified. For example, in Figure 6, after ten
rounds, probability of false positive is close to zero, and
probability of false negative is just around 0.6, which
indicates that at least 40% of dishonest users can be
detected in one execution of the algorithm.
Now we focus on the cooperative detection algorithm,
i.e., Algorithm 3. Figure 7 compares the probability of
false positive for the randomized detection algorithm
(Algorithm 1) with its corresponding cooperative version
(Algorithm 3). Results show that our theoretic analysis
provides a good approximation of probability of false
positive, which validates the effectiveness of the termi-
nation condition used in the complete detection algo-
rithm. Moreover, comparing the two groups of curves,
we can see that probability of false positive of the
cooperative algorithm is always smaller than that of
the non-cooperative algorithm, which implies that the
cooperative scheme effectively speeds up the detection.
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Fig. 7: The improvement of probability of false positive
for the cooperative algorithm (Algorithm 3) where δ =
0.1 and p = 0.8.
Now we focus on the detection algorithm dealing with
user churn, i.e., Algorithm 4, and the results are shown in
Figure 8. In the figure, one group of curves corresponds
to the case where cooperative algorithm is employed, i.e.,
using Algorithm 3 to derive the suspicious set in the first
step of Algorithm 4, the other group corresponds to the
case where cooperative detection is not used, i.e., using
Algorithm 1 to derive the suspicious set in the first step.
To simulate user churn, we add a new neighbor to the
detector with probability 0.3 in each round. Simulation
results show that probability of false positive goes to
zero eventually, which implies that users in the suspi-
cious set must be dishonest with high probability after
sufficient number of rounds. At last, we also observe the
speedup of the detection for the cooperative algorithm.
Let us look at the distribution of number of detection
rounds for the randomized detection algorithm, i.e., Al-
gorithm 1. Results are shown in Figure 9. The horizontal
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Fig. 8: Probability of false positive of the algorithm
dealing with user churn (Algorithm 4) where δ = 0.1
and p = 0.8.
axis is the number of rounds needed for the detection,
and the vertical axis is the probability mass function. We
can see that even if the probability mass function is not
accurately quantified, the expected number of rounds,
E[R], is still well approximated. The deviation of the
probability mass function can be explained as follows.
First, the probability of an honest user giving correct
recommendations is not a constant at each round, e.g., as
more users purchase a product, the probability of giving
correct recommendations also increases since more users
can have their own valuations. Therefore, there must
be an approximation error when we use a constant
parameter, say phc, to approximate it. Second, since the
performance measure is quantified in a probabilistic way,
it is required to run the simulation many times so as to
match with the theoretic results. However, running the
simulation too many times takes a lot of time because of
the large graph size. To balance the tradeoff, we only run
the simulation 1000 times, and the inadequate number of
simulation times also contributes to the approximation
error. However, since the detection algorithm does not
require the accurate quantification of the distribution of
R, it is still effective to employ the algorithm to identify
dishonest users even if an approximation error exists.
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Fig. 9: Probability mass function of R when the random-
ized detection algorithm is used and δ = 0.1 and p = 0.8.
7.4 Evaluation on Real Data
As we stated in Section 1, the problem we considered in
this paper is an abstraction of viral marketing problems
in OSNs, and so there is no publicly available dataset
that is drawn from an OSN specialized for viral market-
ing. Therefore, to further validate the effectiveness of our
detection algorithm, we consider a real dataset from a
social rating network, where users share their ratings on
movies and also establish friendships with others. In the
following, we first describe the dataset, then illustrate on
how to implement our detection algorithm, and finally
show the results.
Dataset: We use the Flixster dataset which is drawn
from a social network where users share their ratings
on movies with their friends [20]. The underlying social
network contains around 1M users and 26.7M social
relations. Users can give ratings in the range [0.5, 5] with
step size 0.5, and there are 8.2M ratings in this dataset.
Since we classify products into two types in this work,
i.e., trustworthy products and untrustworthy products,
to drive evaluations using the Flixster dataset, we map
each rating to a binary value (i.e., either 0 or 1) by
splitting from the middle of the range (i.e., 2.5). That
is, we take the ratings that are greater than 2.5 as high
ratings, and consider others as low ratings. By analyzing
this dataset, we find that for around 90% of movies, more
than 75% of users have a consistent valuation. This also
confirms the assumptions we make in our framework.
Algorithm Implementation: Since our detection algo-
rithm is fully distributed and can be executed by any
user. To select a detector, we randomly choose a user
who has a large number of friends and also gives a
lot of ratings. In particular, the detector chosen in this
evaluation has around 900 friends and gives around 200
ratings. Among the 900 friends, around 700 of them
have only one rating or even no rating on all of the
movies the detector rated, so we ignore them in the
evaluation. Since all users in this dataset are honest, to
emulate malicious activities, we randomly set 10% of
the detector’s neighbors as dishonest users and let them
promote one particular movie. In particular, we modify
the ratings given by these dishonest users based on the
intelligent strategy formalized in Equation (1). We run
the randomized detection algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1)
at the detector, and measure the probability of false
negative and the probability of false positive based on
the definitions in Equations (2)-(3) so as to validate the
effectiveness of the detection algorithm.
Detection Results: The results of probability of false
positive Pfp(t) and probability of false negative Pfn(t)
are shown in Figure 10. We can see that probability
of false positive continues to decrease as the algorithm
executes for more and more rounds, and finally falls
below a small probability. This implies that most honest
users can be successfully removed from the suspicious
set. On the other hand, probability of false negative
also increases, which indicates the possibility of miss
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detection. However, we can see that when probability
of false positive drops below 0.1, probability of false
negative only increases to 0.3. This shows the effective-
ness of the detection algorithm. In particular, more than
70% of dishonest users can be accurately identified in
one execution of the algorithm, and so we can keep
executing the algorithm for multiple times so to identify
all dishonest users. Another important point we like to
stress is that the number of detection rounds in this
evaluation is not small, e.g., probability of false positive
only decreases to 0.3 after 50 rounds. The main reason
is that in this dataset, most users only give very few
ratings, and so many neighbors do not give any rating in
most of the detection rounds, which makes them remain
in the suspicious set for a long time.
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Fig. 10: Probability of false positive and probability of
false negative of the randomized detection algorithm on
real dataset.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we develop a set of fully distributed
and randomized detection algorithms based on the idea
of shrinking suspicious set so to identify dishonest
users in OSNs. We formalize the behaviors of dishonest
users wherein they can probabilistically bad-mouth other
products while give positive recommendations on the
product they aim to promote. Our detection algorithms
allow users to independently perform the detection so as
to discover their dishonest neighbors. We provide math-
ematical analysis on quantifying the effectiveness and
efficiency of the detection algorithms. We also propose
a cooperative scheme to speed up the detection, as well
as an algorithm to handle network dynamics, i.e., “user
churn” in OSNs. Via simulations, we first show that the
market share distribution may be severely distorted by
misleading recommendations given by a small fraction
of dishonest users, and then validate the effectiveness
and efficiency of our detection algorithms. The detection
framework in this paper can be viewed as a valuable tool
to maintain the viability of viral marketing in OSNs.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1 IN SECTION 4.3
We first focus on probability of false negative Pfn(t).
Note that Si(t) only shrinks in detectable rounds, so we
have
Pfn(t)=P{a dishonest user j is considered to be honest}
=1−P{j is not removed from the suspicious set
in all detectable rounds}
=1−
t∏
τ=1,d(τ)=1
P{j ∈ D(τ)}.
To compute the probability that a dishonest user stays in
D(τ) in a detectable round τ , observe that the product
detector i purchases at this round must be a trustworthy
product which is not promoted by any dishonest user.
We assume that dishonest users give recommendations
at every round so as to attract as many buyers as
possible. Based on the intelligent strategy, a dishonest
user gives correct recommendations on this product with
probability δ, and this recommendation is also correct
for detector i as we assume that dishonest users have
the same valuation with majority users, so we have
P{j ∈ D(τ)} = 1− δ, and probability of false negative is
Pfn(t)=1−
t∏
τ=1,d(τ)=1
(1− δ) = 1−
(
1− δ
)∑t
τ=1 d(τ)
.
To derive probability of false positive Pfp(t), based on
the definition in Equation (3), it can be rewritten as
Pfp(t) = P{j ∈ Si(t)|H(t)}
= P{j ∈ Si(t− 1)|H(t)} ×
P{j ∈ Si(t)|j ∈ Si(t− 1)&H(t)}
= Pfp(t− 1)× P{j is not removed
at round t|j ∈ Si(t− 1)&H(t)}, (8)
where j is an honest friend of detector i. To compute
the probability that j is not removed at round t, we
first consider the case where round t is detectable.
Considering that a user in an OSN usually has a large
number of neighbors and dishonest users only account
for a small fraction, so we approximate the probability of
an honest user in the suspicious set not being removed
at round t as |D(t−1)∩D(t)||D(t−1)| . On the other hand, if round
t is not detectable, then the corresponding probability
is simply one. For ease of presentation, we always let
D(t) = D(t − 1) if round t is not detectable, so the
probability can still be expressed as |D(t−1)∩D(t)||D(t−1)| . By
substituting it in Equation (8), we have
Pfp(t) ≈
t∏
τ=1,d(τ)=1
|D(τ − 1) ∩ D(τ)|
|D(τ − 1)|
,
where D(0) is initialized as Ni and D(τ) is set as D(τ−1)
if d(τ) = 0.
Now we focus on the third performance measure R,
which denotes the number of rounds needed to shrink
the suspicious set until it only contains dishonest users.
Note that the suspicious set can shrink at round t only
when this round is detectable, i.e., d(t) = 1. Therefore,
15
we first derive the distribution of number of detectable
rounds, and denote it by a random variable D. Formally,
we have
P (D ≤ d)=P{after d detectable rounds, all users
in the suspicious set are dishonest}
=P{all honest users are removed from the
suspicious set after d detectable rounds}
=(1− (1− phc)
d)N−k,
where k is the number of dishonest neighbors of detector
i and phc denotes the average probability of an honest
user being removed from the suspicious set at each
round, i.e., the average probability of an honest user
giving correct recommendations at each round.
Based on the distribution of D, we can derive the dis-
tribution of R. Specifically, the conditional distribution
P (R = r|D = d) is a negative binomial distribution, so
we have
P (R=r)=
∑r
d=1
P (D = d)P (R = r|D = d)
=
∑r
d=1
(
r − 1
d− 1
)
(pd)
d(1− pd)
r−dP (D = d),
where pd denotes the probability of a round being de-
tectable. Based on the distribution of R, the expected
number of rounds E[R] can be easily derived.
For probabilities phc and pd, we can estimate them
based on the detection history of detector i. Specifically,
to measure phc, for each honest neighbor j of detector
i, we first count the number of rounds where user j
gives correct recommendations to detector i, then use
the fraction of rounds where user j gives correct recom-
mendations as an approximation of the corresponding
average probability. Finally, we can approximate phc by
taking an average over all honest neighbors of detector
i. Mathematically, we have
phc ≈
1
N − k
∑
honest j∈Ni
# of rounds where j gives correct rec.
total # of rounds
,
(9)
where k denotes the number of dishonest neighbors of
detector i. With respect to pd, note that pd equals to
the probability that detector i valuates her purchased
product as a trustworthy product in a round and this
round is further used for detection. To estimate it, we
use a 0-1 random variable 1{Ti(Pjt) = 1} to indicate
whether product Pjt that is purchased by detector i at
round t is a trustworthy product or not, and we have
pd = p · lim
n→∞
∑n
t=1 1{Ti(Pjt) = 1}
n
. (10)
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 IN SECTION 5
Note that the detection at round t is divided into two
steps, the independent detection step and the coopera-
tive detection step. In the independent detection step,
detector i shrinks her suspicious set based on her local
information, i.e., via Algorithm 1. In the cooperative
detection step, detector i further shrinks her suspicious
set based on her neighbors’ detection results. We use
C(t) to denote the set of neighbors which are removed
from the suspicious set in the cooperative detection step
at round t. Based on Equation (8), probability of false
positive can be expressed as follows.
Pfp(t) = Pfp(t− 1)× P{j is not removed
at round t|j ∈ Si(t− 1)&H(t)}
= Pfp(t− 1)PIS(t)PCS(t),
where j an honest friend of detector i, PIS(t) and PCS(t)
denote the probabilities that an honest user in the sus-
picious set is not removed in the independent detection
step and the cooperative detection step, respectively.
To derive PIS(t), since the suspicious set shrinks based
on Algorithm 1 in the independent detection step, we
can directly use the result in Theorem 1. We have
PIS(t) ≈
|D(t− 1) ∩ D(t)|
|D(t− 1)|
,
where D(t) is set as D(t− 1) if round t is not detectable
(i.e., when d(t) = 0).
To compute PCS(t) that is the probability that an
honest user in the suspicious set is not removed in the
cooperative detection step, we first compute the prob-
ability of false positive before the cooperative detection
step at round t, and denote it by P ISfp (t). Mathematically,
P ISfp (t) ≈ Pfp(t− 1)
|D(t− 1) ∩ D(t)|
|D(t − 1)|
.
Thus, there are P ISfp (t)(N − k) honest users in the suspi-
cious set if the detector has k dishonest neighbors. Since
|C(t)| users are removed from the suspicious set in the
cooperative detection step, we have
PCS(t) =
P ISfp (t)(N − k)− |C(t)|
P ISfp (t)(N − k)
.
Now probability of false positive after t rounds can be
derived as follows.
Pfp(t) ≈
Pfp(t−1)
|D(t−1)∩D(t)|
|D(t−1)| (N − k)− |C(t)|
N − k
. (11)
If k ≪ N , then probability of false positive Pfp(t) after
t rounds can be approximated as
Pfp(t) ≈
Pfp(t− 1)
|D(t−1)∩D(t)|
|D(t−1)| N − |C(t)|
N
. (12)
Note that if k ≪ N does not hold, then probability of
false positive in Equation (12) is just an overestimation
of Equation (11), so it is still feasible to be used in the
termination condition of the complete algorithm.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3 IN SECTION 6
Inspired from the previous analysis, we divide the de-
tection at round t into three steps: (1) the independent
detection step, (2) the cooperative detection step, and
(3) the detection step dealing with user churn. More-
over, probability of false positive after the cooperative
detection step at round t can be derived by Equation
(11), and we denote it as PCSfp (t). Since users in NU(t)
connect with detector i and users in L(t) leave detector
i at round t, suppose that dishonest users only account
for a small fraction of the population, there are around
N(t − 1) − k + |NU(t)| − |L(t)| honest users in the
neighboring set after round t, where N(t − 1) denotes
the number of neighbors of detector i after round t− 1
and N(t) = N(t − 1) + |NU(t)| − |L(t)|. Moreover, the
number of honest users in the suspicious set after round
t is PCSfp (t)∗(N(t−1)−k)+|NU(t)|−|LS(t)|, so probability
of false positive after t rounds can be computed via
Pfp(t) ≈
PCSfp (t)∗(N(t−1)−k)+|NU(t)|−|LS(t)|
N(t)−k . If k ≪ N(t−1)
and we substitute PCSfp (t) with the result in Equation
(11), we have
Pfp(t)≈
Pfp(t−1)
|D(t−1)∩D(t)|
|D(t−1)|
N(t−1)−|C(t)|+|NU (t)|−|LS(t)|
N(t)
.
Again, if k ≪ N(t) for all t does not hold, probability
of false positive computed via the above equation is just
overestimated, and it is still effective to use it to design
the termination condition of the complete algorithm.
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